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THE IMPACT OF THE RECESSION 
ON MIGRATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Jon Simmons*
This article sets out to explore in brief what the available statistics say about the 
impact of the 2008-2009 economic recession on international migration to and 
from the UK. In short, statistics suggest that economic migrants responded to the 
recession in the way that one might expect, with a reduced inflow and increased 
outflow of long-term migrants coming to work in the UK, in particular within the 
EU free market, although these changes did not quite translate into a net reduc-
tion in this group despite the domestic economic conditions. For non-EU 
migrants, the dominance of non-work-related flows meant that the recession did 
not influence them in the same way and the resultant reduction in overall net 
migration was only slight.
A Short History of Recent Migration to the UK
Although the United Kingdom has seen a great deal of international migration 
over the course of the last century, for much of that period the numbers leaving 
were often as great or greater than the numbers arriving, resulting in low or nega-
tive net migration, as measured by the international definition relating to people 
changing their normal place of residence for a period of 12 months or more. 
Following two decades of reduced inward migration and low or negative levels of 
net migration, immigration to the UK began to grow in the 1980s; perhaps reflect-
ing the global growth in international travel, the numbers began to escalate from the 
mid-1990s (see Chart 1). Although some of this growth was in temporary migration, 
the number of emigrants did not keep up, resulting in a sharp rise in net migration.
The new migrants to the UK came from across the globe. In previous decades, 
large numbers of migrants had come from Ireland and the Caribbean. In the 
1990s, the largest numbers came from the former British colonies in south Asia 
and Africa. Other countries such as China and the Philippines also supplied large 
numbers. Beginning in 2004, a significant new influx began from the Eastern 
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long-term international migration in tHe united kingdom
sourCe: ons (2011c).
ips Estimates of Long-term International Migration in the UK (1964-2010)
table 1
top ten foreign nationalities resident in tHe united kingdom (2012)
United Kingdom
thousands
 Nationality Estimate CI +/-
1 Poland 700 36
2 India 348 26
3 Republic of Ireland 314 24
4 Pakistan 180 18
5 United States of America 158 17
6 Lithuania 140 16
7 Germany 131 16
8 Italy 129 16
9 France 123 15
10 Portugal 111 15
sourCe: ons (2013).
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European countries that had recently joined the European Union (often referred 
to as “the new accession states” or “A8 nationals”), particularly Poland. Polish 
nationals comprise the largest foreign nationality currently resident in the UK, 
whereas prior to the Polish accession that position was held by people originating 
from India, a large proportion of whom subsequently gained British citizenship. 
Just under half (47 percent) of the UK’s foreign population is made up from the 
top 10 foreign nationalities (see Table 1).
table 2
net migration by Country of last and next residenCe (2000-2012)
thousands
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
European Union -14 -11 -38 -23 28 48 65 88 21 54 73 79 67
European Union 15 -14 -11 -38 -23 -14 -11 -8 2 -9 26 18 27 33
European Union A8  –  –  –  – 47 59 69 88 23 18 43 41 31
European 
Union Other
 –  –  –  – -7 0 4 -1 8 11 12 11 3
Rest of Europe 28 13 19 0 5 3 4 2 -2 2 -1 -5 7
Old 
Commonwealth
-1 11 -8 -12 2 -9 -34 -29 -18 -32 -7 -23 -19
Australia -18 -1 -15 -23 -16 -12 -28 -27 -26 -27 -10 -22 -20
Canada 2 -3 -5 5 -4 -5 -4 -2 -1 -3 0 1 1
New Zealand 1 1 -6 -8 -7 -8 -9 -7 -4 -6 2 -6 1
South Africa 15 14 17 14 28 15 7 6 14 4 1 5 1
New 
Commonwealth
79 74 73 86 122 101 106 103 94 109 124 103 58
Africam 
Commonwealth
23 25 36 34 39 26 16 19 23 23 15 12 10
Indian 
sub-continent
42 40 36 47 81 70 85 77 63 78 99 93 43
Other 
Commonwealth
14 10 2 5 2 4 4 7 8 8 11 -1 4
USA -10 -3 -9 3 2 1 -6 4 5 4 -3 -1 7
Rest of the Americas 6 2 4 2 2 -1 3 2 2 4 5 2 2
Middle East 15 21 21 19 18 8 6 12 9 11 10 9 10
Other 55 65 91 73 68 56 55 51 51 46 52 50 44
All countries 158 171 153 148 245 206 198 233 163 198 252 215 177
note: Figures may not sum due to independent rounding.
sourCe: House of Commons Library (2014).
80 JON SIMMONS
The United Kingdom is one of the most significant recipient nations for foreign 
migrants within Europe. In 2011, for example, the number of long-term migrants 
arriving was the highest in the European Union. The net migration figure was only 
higher in Germany and Italy (see Table 3). The situation in Germany has changed 
greatly over recent years, and its 2011 figure was the highest for a decade. Many Ger -
man migrants are also temporary seasonal workers. In the UK, however, like Italy 
and, to a lesser extent, Spain until the most recent period, the numbers of migrants 
leaving have been considerably fewer than those arriving, resulting in high levels of 
net migration (see Table 3).
Differences in migration patterns are one obvious explanatory factor for differ-
ences in the demand for migrants since some countries have a history of low-skilled 
migration, for example, or high numbers of asylum seekers. Another factor that may 
be significant is population growth, and specifically whether a country is able to 
refresh its labor force from its own citizens. A comparison of fertility rates across the 
EU suggests two very different groups of countries (see Chart 2). One, which includes 
France, Sweden, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, has a fertility rate well 
above the European average, and closer to a replacement rate (although currently 
only Ireland is at or around replacement levels).1 However, this “higher fertility” 
group comprises less than one-third of the EU member states, with other countries 
showing much lower fertility rates of between 1.3 and 1.6 (see Chart 2). Although 
there has been a general recovery in European fertility rates since their low point in 
the late 1990s, for the majority of countries, fertility rates are nowhere near the levels 
required to offer replacement of the current population. For many countries in 
Europe, this therefore implies a potential gap in their labor force, which migration 
might help to fill. For France and the United Kingdom, for example, this pressure 
would not apply to the same extent as in other large recipient nations.
How Do We Define a Recession and When
Was the Most Recent One?
An economic recession is generally identified as a period of temporary economic 
decline during which trade and industrial activity are reduced, technically defined 
by a fall in real gdp in two successive quarters. For the UK, the most recent sus-
tained recession occurred between spring 2008 and summer 2009. Although the 
UK has not strictly been in a sustained recession since then, the recovery has been 
somewhat hesitant as the Chart 3 shows. 
Compared to the rest of Europe, the UK experienced recession earlier and 
began to recover from it earlier. Although the recovery has shown some positive 
1  The replacement fertility rate is around 2.1 births per woman in developed countries, but it can be 
higher in developing countries where child mortality rates are higher.
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table 3 
immigration and net migration in tHe european union (2011)
2011 Immigration Net Migration
EU (27 Countries) 1 701 500 460 000 
United Kingdom 566 044 215 341 
Germany 489 422 240 377 
Italy 385 793 303 332 
Spain 371 331 (37 703)
France 319 816  54 000 
Poland 157 059 (108 739)
Belgium 144 698  77 223 
Netherlands 130 118  25 917 
Greece 110 823 (15 161)
Austria 104 354  36 473 
Sweden   96 467  45 288 
Ireland   53 224 (33 829)
Denmark   52 833  11 240 
Finland   29 481  16 821 
Hungary   28 018  12 918 
Czech Republic   27 114 (28 796)
Cyprus   23 037 18 142 
Luxembourg   20 268 11 004 
Portugal   19 667 (24 331)
Lithuania   15 685 (38 178)
Slovenia   14 083    2 059 
Croatia     8 534   (4 165)
Latvia     7 253 (23 127)
Malta     5 465    1 659 
Slovakia     4 829    2 966 
SourCe: Eurostat Statistics Database (n.d.a). 
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gdp growth in recent quarters, as in previous recessions, it has taken longer for this to 
translate into falls in unemployment; in fact, unemployment rates, both in the UK and 
the rest of Europe, rose considerably following the recession (from May 2008 to 
about mid-2009) and have remained relatively high since then (see Chart 4, previ-
ous page).
The relationship between gdp changes, unemployment levels, employment, 
and hence the demand for labor is not straightforward. Generally, it is thought that 
a recovery in gdp may not immediately translate into a growth in employment, 
since companies respond initially through making more use of existing workers, 
overtime, and other temporary adjustments. Only once there is greater confidence 
in the recovery do we tend to see a rise in jobs and labor market recovery.
What Happened to Migration during the Recession?
The main migration statistics for the UK are produced by the Office for National 
Statistics based on its International Passenger Survey. They identify migrants 
according to international definitions, that is, as persons who change their normal 
place of residence for more than a year. The estimates are produced for a rolling 
four quarters (one year), and the estimates best corresponding to the start of the 
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recession in spring 2008 would be the long-term migration statistics for the year 
ending September 2008, that is, the four-quarter estimate the midpoint for which 
is closest to the month or quarter when the recession began.
 We would expect economic conditions to have a strong impact on the number 
of migrants coming to the UK to take up employment or to look for a job. The UK 
has a relatively flexible labor market that might make international labor migrants 
particularly responsive to economic conditions, more so than in a more heavily reg-
ulated labor market. The demand for migrant workers will also vary between different 
sectors and occupations. Other factors that may influence migration will include 
the existing relationship with the country of origin, such as the existing stock of 
migrants or a large Diaspora (and therefore family and other reasons that might 
suppress mobility), relative global economic conditions, and the availability of jobs 
in other countries, the attractiveness of the education sector, affordability (for exam-
ple, due to movements in the currency exchange rate), and an ability to speak the 
same language. However, it is undoubtedly the case that the need for migrant labor, 
how it varies across sectors, and how it change depending on the state of the economy 
are “highly contested” (Ruhs and Anderson 2010). 
For total long-term migration to the UK, the period of the recession coincided 
with a sharp fall in immigration but an even sharper fall in emigration, so that, over-
all, net migration rose slightly. That is, in a period when the economy was contract-
ing and unemployment rising, more people were still coming to reside in the UK than 
were leaving to go elsewhere. It is worth noting that the onset of recession coincid-
ed with the introduction of a new Points-Based System, which may also have had 
some impact on migration flows. However —and not withstanding this point—, as 
the recession ended in the fourth quarter of 2009, immigration recovered and began 
to rise again, but emigration did not, resulting in a further steep rise in net migration.
Around half of this hike in net migration could be accounted for by a fall in 
British emigration. In the year ending September 2008, an estimated 173 000 Bri t-
ish citizens left the UK to go abroad for more than a year, but two years later (in the 
year ending September 2010), the number of British emigrants had fallen to 122 000. 
This change alone would add around 50 000 to the net migration figure, which 
rose from +160 000 to +254 000 over the same period.
There appears to be some relationship between unemployment levels and the 
emigration of British citizens in recent years, in that rising unemployment has been 
associated with lower levels of emigration. This may appear at first to be coun-
terintuitive in that, if economic conditions weaken we might expect to see more 
peo ple move abroad to look for work. However, it could be that when people lack 
economic security their first priority is to obtain some stability at home rather than 
seek work abroad. Or, it could also be a response to the global nature of the recession 
and the lack of new job opportunities in countries where British citizens might have 
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otherwise moved to work. Whichever driver is dominant, the lack of a swift recovery 
in the UK labor market and labor market conditions in key destination countries has 
meant that the emigration numbers for British citizens have remained low.
However, the next biggest contribution to the uptick in net migration both 
during the recession and after it was from the inflow of foreign citizens. The net 
migration of non-British citizens rose from +253 000 to +296 000 between the 
year ending September 2008 and the year ending September 2010. If the domi-
nant driver were economic, this finding might appear surprising.
We can see the expected impact of the economic conditions most clearly in the 
numbers for the new European nationals arriving in the UK (that is, the eight most 
recent accession states, sometimes referred to as the “A8”). These countries were 
admitted to the European Union in 2004 and gained freedom-of-movement rights, 
although in many countries these rights were initially restricted for up to seven years 
(although in the UK, unlike most other EU states, they were not).2 Most of the 
2  Nationals of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, and Slovakia could face temporary restrictions on working in another EU country, but for no 
more than seven years after their countries joined the EU (Bulgaria and Romania joined on January 1, 
2007; all the others on May 1, 2004). In practice, only the Bulgarian and Romanian accession had work 
restrictions imposed in the UK.
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migrants from these countries were relatively young and in the years immediately fol-
lowing the accession came to the UK in relatively large numbers in search of work. 
The numbers of these new European arrivals may have peaked just before the 
recession, but they fell rapidly during the recession and then began to grow again, in 
response to the slight improvement in economic conditions, but perhaps also as a 
result of families being formed by the first waves of arrivals. The inverse effect can be 
seen in emigration by A8 nationals, with the result that by the end of the recession 
period, for the first time since their accession to the EU and for only one set of esti-
mates (those for the year ending September 2009), the number leaving was greater 
than the number arriving and the net migration of A8 nationals was therefore negative. 
For migrants from outside the European Union coming to the UK the picture 
was different. They did not have the freedom-of-movement rights enjoyed by EU 
nationals and their ability to take jobs was restricted. The low-skilled immigration 
route for work by foreign nationals from outside the EU (Tier 3 of the Points-Based 
System) had been closed since its introduction in 2008. Aside from certain short-
age occupations and those family members or students with rights to work, the 
main routes to come to the UK to work were heavily regulated. For these reasons, 
as the table below shows, according to the International Passenger Survey, the pro-
portion of non-EU, long-term migrants arriving for work was considerably smaller 
than for European migrants, amounting to just 18 percent of the total inflow in the 
year ending March 2011. The largest group of non-EU migrants coming to the UK 
to stay for a year or longer was now made up of students rather than workers, a 
change in the pattern of migration that occurred at the same time as the recession 
took hold.
table 4
proportions of old eu, new-aCCession eu and non-eu immigrants 
to tHe uk Coming to work, aCCompany or Join someone, or to study 
(Year Ending March 2011)
Place of Origin EU15 A8 Non-EU
All reasons 72 000 69 000 307 000
Work-related 50% 68% 18%
Accompany/Join 4% 6% 18%
Study 40% 14% 58%
Other 6% 12% 5%
sourCe: ons (2011b).
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Nonetheless, there were still considerable numbers of low-skilled workers 
coming to the UK, as family members alongside the skilled workers applying 
through the UK’s Points-Based System, or as students with rights to take on a limited 
amount of work, and whose number we might therefore expect to be affected by 
economic conditions.
For non-EU migrants, there was a reduction in immigration during the reces-
sion and a slight rise in emigration, but the changes were not as large as had been 
seen in more normal periods, and the net result was only a slightly lower net migra-
tion figure for non-EU citizens, falling to roughly the same level it had been four or 
five years earlier, and from which the recovery post-recession appeared to be swift.
However, as mentioned above, the motives and make-up of non-EU migrants 
was significantly different from the European migrants. EU citizens migrating to 
the UK were primarily coming to work, and it is therefore unsurprising that their 
numbers were significantly affected by the recession. Non-EU foreign nationals, 
however, came to the UK for a wider variety of reasons. More than two-thirds (68 
percent) of the new European state nationals arriving in the UK in the latest year 
came to work, compared to only 18 percent of the non-Europeans. A further 18 
percent of non-EU migrants came for family or relationship reasons. However, by 
far the largest group was made up of those who came to study. 
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The growth in the number of student migrants to the degree that they now 
outnumber work migrants to the UK is a recent phenomenon. However, it has 
been rapid. The number of undergraduates arriving from non-EU countries at UK 
universities more than doubled from just under 32 000 at the start of the last 
decade to 69 000 in 2010-2011; for post-graduates, numbers tripled over the 
same period from 33 300 to 105 000 (Hesa, 2000, 2010). Similar data is not avail-
able for the non-higher-education sector, but visa data would seem to suggest a 
growth in the further education and private education sectors, also.
Although there has been long-term growth in the number of foreign students 
coming to the UK for most of the last decade, it was only during the recent reces-
sion that their number overtook the numbers of foreign migrants coming to the UK 
to work. At the start of the last decade, almost twice as many long-term migrants 
came to the UK to work compared to those who came to study (163 000 compared 
to 84 000 in the year ending December 2000). By the end of the decade, the num-
bers of those who came to work had risen (to 193 000 by the year ending December 
2010), but the numbers of those who came to study were greater, at 236 000. 
As a result of this change in the composition of foreign migrants, it is not surpris-
ing that the impact of the recession was much greater for the Europeans exercising 
CHart 8
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their freedom-of-movement rights to work than it was for non-European migrants, 
the majority of whom were now coming to the UK to study.
Migrants coming for family or marriage were by-and-large not affected by the 
economic conditions. Those coming to study (predominantly the non-Europeans) 
continued to grow in number, most sharply at the formal end of the recession. One 
might hypothesize that when job opportunities are scarce, it makes sense to try to 
improve one’s skills and education to make oneself more attractive to future employ-
ers once they start to recruit again or simply to make productive use of one’s time. 
There is also evidence that some of the rise in student numbers came from low-
skilled migrants, whose route into the UK had been closed by the latter half of the 
decade, and who were using the student route to obtain entry into the UK and, once 
there, work rather than study.3 Whatever the motivation, foreign student numbers 
grew rapidly over this period, the growth only ending when the government began 
to take more stringent action against some of the educational establishments that 
3  According to the Labour Force Survey in 2009 more than half (53 percent) of undergraduates reported 
working for more than the permitted 21 hours per week (Home Office 2010, 17).
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appeared to be providing inadequate provision for their students or were using the 
cloak of study to facilitate their employment.
What Happened to Foreign Workers 
During the Recession? 
The impact of the recession on migrants who came to work can be clearly seen in 
the ips measure of migration. Prior to the start of the recession (year ending June 
2008), immigration for reasons related to work —either to look for a job or to take 
up the offer of a definite job— peaked at 239 000. By the end of the recession (year 
ending September 2009), that number had fallen by more than a quarter (26 per-
cent) to 177 000. Thereafter, it has remained broadly level, with only a small 
increase to 191 000 in the year ending September 2010.4
An alternative measure is provided by the Labour Force Survey (lfs), also pro-
duced by ons, which is used to estimate the employment levels of all workers aged 
16-74. The lfs does not actually measure migration directly, only stocks of workers 
(and non-workers) among the adult population at different points in time, but it 
might be reasonable to assume that the changes in the estimated levels of migrants 
in the lfs might equate to a net change in the flow of migrants between the relevant 
time periods, as indicated by the ips. In practice, for a variety of methodological 
reasons the comparison is not exact.
The lfs publishes data on a quarterly basis (rather than the rolling four quar-
ters used in the ips), so the peak prior to the recession was in the April-June 2008 
quarter, when the total number of foreign nationals with employment was esti-
mated to be 2.3 million. When using non-seasonally adjusted lfs data, it is impor-
tant to compare one quarter with the same quarter in earlier years, rather than the 
preceding quarter, to avoid mistaking seasonal changes for an underlying trend. At 
the turn of the century, in January-March 2000, the lfs estimated there were just 
over one million foreign national workers in the UK; by the end of the decade, 
there were just under 2.3 million, a 107-percent increase, compared to just 1.2 
percent for native workers. Almost half the increase came after the accession of 
the new European states, whose numbers rose from 29 000 in January-March 
2000 to just under half a million 10 years later.
The lfs tends to be a popular data source among economists because of its 
importance for measuring labor market activity and, as a measure of certain 
4  ons changed their method for aligning ips and ltim tables during 2012 which means that the most 
recent published statistics have been prepared on a slightly different basis. Numbers quoted here are 
based on comparisons of the statistical tables produced prior to this adjustment. Although consistent 
comparisons are not available in the latest data, the trends are very similar.
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aspects of employment, it is the only source available. However, it is a less than 
perfect measure of international migration.
According to the lfs, over the course of the recession, the numbers of foreign 
national workers appear to grow (albeit by a lower rate than previously). The 
decline in foreign nationals with jobs did eventually arrive, six months after it hit 
UK nationals, according to the lfs. 
The lfs data are reported in two different ways for migrants: one measures 
numbers of people who were born outside the UK and the other, people who are 
foreign nationals. Those born abroad will include a large proportion who have 
since changed their nationality and become British citizens. These long-term 
migrants are no longer “foreign” nor come under immigration control, and so the 
more appropriate statistic to use from the lfs to look at trends in migration will 
normally be that for foreign nationals. This is also the basis for the ips estimates.
The fluctuations in employment levels shown in the lfs seemed to be more 
extreme for foreign workers. Some of this could in part be due to the variability in 
the quarterly survey results for groups (such as foreign nationals) with only a rela-
CHart 10 
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tively small representation in a survey aimed at measuring changes in the population 
as a whole. This could be true for the ips, given that this survey aims to measure all 
of the flows across the UK border, the largest volume of which belong to British trav-
elers and short-term visitors, but the effects might be accentuated in the lfs because 
it is designed to estimate stocks of workers rather than their migratory flow.
However, the main difference between the lfs and the ips is due to the coverage 
of the two surveys. Specifically, the lfs includes all migrants including short-term 
migrants, whereas the ips records migrant movements according to the interna-
tional definition, that is, “a person who moves to a country other than that of his or 
her usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months), so that the country 
of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence” (UN 
Statistics Division 2013). Although a more restrictive definition of a migrant, this 
is a more robust measure of migrant movements because the inclusion of short-term 
migration in the lfs estimates for foreign nationals will tend to blur the underlying 
longer-term changes in migrant behavior and make it harder to identify trends 
clearly. This criticism will also apply to the other measure sometimes used to estimate 
numbers of foreign nationals: new registrations for national insurance numbers 
produced by the Department for Work and Pensions (and this source has the addi-
tional constraint of only recording those migrants who are working). For this reason, 
the ips tends to be the most reliable measure of changes in long-term migration. 
Further information on the differences between the lfs and ips is provided in 
Appendix A and in the paper written by Ker, Zumpe, and Blake for the Office for 
National Statistics (2009). 
Nevertheless, the lfs data can provide additional insights into the foreign 
workforce in the UK, and the contrast between foreign and native workers can 
appear stark. 
According to the lfs data the recession came to the foreign workforce in the 
UK later than for the native population, but when it did come, it hit harder (falls of 
2-4 percent per quarter, compared to 0-2 percent for native workers). However, its 
effects lasted only three quarters, whereas for native workers, the drop in employ-
ment lasted for six or seven (see Table 5).
Although the timing and extent of changes might be distorted by the coverage 
issues already mentioned, the pattern revealed by the lfs would seem to reflect 
the greater flexibility in the foreign workforce, which is one of their potential 
attractions for employers, particularly vis-à-vis Europeans who could return to 
their home country more easily when times were hard —and it may be worth not-
ing in this respect that Poland was the only economy in Europe to have positive 
gdp growth in 2009. However, for employment-related migration, the pattern also 
appears to be true for non-Europeans. 
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Is This Response to the Recession as Expected?
Before the end of the recession, Dobson and colleagues published a short paper 
(Dobson, Latham, and Salt 2009) that looked at the experience of past recessions 
to see what that might suggest for migration during the current one. Their paper 
asks the question whether “buffer theory,” which provides a theoretical description 
of how migrants might be used by an economy to provide greater flexibility, portrays 
what actually happens in the real world. Drawing on Böhning and Maillat (1974), 
the paper describes buffer theory as the idea that society might “bring in tempo-
rary workers when labor shortages existed, who would then go home during eco-
nomic downturns.” Dobson and her colleagues found that, in practice, this did not 
really occur in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, nor did it occur specifically in the 
UK. In the three earlier recessions they looked at, although there was indeed evi-
dence of “a fall in numbers of foreign migrants entering the UK, albeit for a limited 
period, . . . there is no evidence of a significant upturn in outflows, contrary to 
what buffer theory would suggest. In fact, the reverse is true” (13).
Drawing on Hatton (2005), Dobson, Latham, and Salt, posit several reasons 
why this might be anticipated. Firstly, unemployment can be shown to tend to 
reduce immigration (Hatton estimated a 1 percent rise in unemployment might 
cause a reduction in net migration of around 5 000 per annum). This is, of course, 
table 5
CHange in employment Compared to same quarter previous year 
(percent) 
Total UK Non UK Non-EU EU14 A8
Apr-Jun 2008 1.2 0.7 7.4 6.7 2.5 15.4
Jul-Sep 2008 0.4 -0.1 7.7 8.9 -2.5 17.0
Oct-Dec 2008 -0.3 -0.9 7.7 12.0 4.6 -0.1
Jan-Mar 2009 -1.2 -1.5 2.6 4.2 1.6 -0.2
Apr-Jun 2009 -2.2 -2.4 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.2
Jul-Sep 2009 -1.8 -1.7 -2.2 -3.8 3.8 -4.3
Oct-Dec 2009 -1.4 -1.2 -3.6 -5.3 -2.4 0.0
Jan-Mar 2010 -1.2 -0.9 -3.9 -4.7 -4.0 -1.9
Apr-Jun 2010 0.4 0.0 4.4 3.1 3.5 8.9
sourCe: ons (n.d.b).
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broadly what happened in the current recession, although the net impact is com-
plicated by the different flows of migration. However, immigration for work rea-
sons certainly fell substantially, and emigration rose, as the chart below shows, 
looking at the migration patterns for non-British nationals for work-related reasons 
alone. The net migration of foreign workers fell from just under +100 000 in the 
year ending December 2007 to +3 000 in the year ending December 2009.
It is also the case that people classed as “labor migrants” will not only be driv-
en by economic factors. Some of those who come to the UK to work will form 
relationships or a family and seek to settle, for example. Previous research (for 
example, Hatton 2005) had found that worsening economic conditions in the UK also 
tend to lead to falls in emigration by UK citizens. The impact of this was relatively 
modest in the past, but that was not the case during the current recession, as has 
already been noted.
However, the most significant reason for the recession in the UK having only 
a relatively modest impact on migration trends overall was due to the changed 
composition of the migratory flows to the UK, and specifically the significant rise 
in student migration over this period. The expected impact on work-related migra-
CHart 11 
long-term international migration by foreign Citizens Coming 
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tion did occur within the European free market —that is, for EU nationals. 
However, work migration represented less than one-fifth of non-European migra-
tion to the UK, whereas by the year ending in December 2009, students repre-
sented 55 percent of the non-Europeans coming to the UK, rising to 60 percent 
just one year later.
The reasons for such a strong rise in foreign students are not clear. British 
universities were active in recruiting foreign students, but evidence also exists of 
growth in non-compliant student migration, in particular to colleges of further 
education whose delivery of a high-quality educational service was not confirmed 
by official inspection. In addition, it is possible that some of the hike in foreign 
student numbers was linked to the depreciation of the currency and a resultant 
reduction in the cost of education in the UK —the U.S.-dollar-value of the pound 
sterling fell by almost one-third between spring 2008 and spring 2009, and against 
the euro by around one-sixth over the same period.
However, as the above chart shows, unsurprisingly, work has for a long time 
been more important as a reason for migration inside the European Union than for 
migrants from outside the EU. As a result, for European migrants the recession 
had the anticipated effect, the labor market worked as anticipated, and, to a sig-
nificant extent, buffer theory could be said to have applied. 
CHart 12 
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For non-European migrants the position is very different. Legal routes to work 
in the UK had become scarcer over the latter half of the last decade, primarily as a 
result of the introduction of the Points-Based System, which to a large degree 
closed the legitimate route for low-skilled workers, and then due to further tight-
ening of entry requirements for other routes under the Coalition Government 
elected in May 2010. As a result, the last decade saw the proportion of non-EU 
immigrants to the UK coming to work fall from just under 40 percent at the start 
of the decade, to around 32 percent in 2005-2006 and then fall sharply to 16-17 
percent in 2010-2011. The reduction was in absolute terms also, with an estimat-
ed 100 000 non-EU workers arriving in the year ending December 2006, dropping 
to around half that number three or four years later. The difference was more than 
made up by numbers of student arrivals from outside the EU.
Appendix A
differenCes between tHe lfs/aps and ips/ltim data 
Stocks: lfs and aPs data Flows: iPs and ltiM data
Sampling 
frame 
Includes all private households. 
Excludes most communal 
residencies. 
The ips samples passengers as they 
arrive in or leave the UK through ports 
(by air, sea, and the Channel Tunnel). 
Adjustments made for those known to 
be missed (e.g., asylum seekers). 
Timing of 
the survey 
Data collected throughout 
each quarter in the case of 
the lfs, and throughout four 
consecutive quarters in the 
case of the aps. 
Single, point-in-time interview. 
Collected throughout the year. 
Definition 
of a migrant 
A migrant is defined as some-
one whose country of birth is 
non-UK or whose nationality 
is non-British. 
Length of time in the UK is 
currently not used to define a 
migrant in the lfs. 
The UN definition is used to define 
a migrant: “Person who moves to a 
country other than that of his or her 
usual residence for a period of at least 
a year (12 months), so that the country 
of destination effectively becomes his 
or her new country of usual residence” 
(UN Statistics Division 2013).
Therefore anyone staying/going for less 
than 12 months is excluded. 
Nationality As stated by respondent. If re-
spondent has dual nationality, 
the first one given is recorded 
in the survey. 
Citizenship is taken from the passport 
shown at the time of the interview, or, 
if this is not available, taken as stated 
by respondent. 
98 JON SIMMONS
Actual versus 
intended 
migration 
The lfs asks for the date of 
arrival in the UK. This can be 
used to calculate the actual 
length of time the respondent 
has lived in the UK. However, 
no information is provided 
regarding how long they may 
remain in the UK. 
The ips collects information on
intended length of time in/outside 
the UK. However, ltim includes ad-
justments for migrants 
who do not fulfill their intentions. 
Students Included, but only if they live 
in private households or have 
at least one parent resident in a 
private household in the UK. 
Included. 
Asylum 
seekers 
Included if living in a private 
residence, but may be 
reluctant to participate. 
Those living in communal 
establishments are excluded. 
Included. A few asylum seekers are 
captured on the ips, and an adjustment 
based on Home Office data on asylum 
seekers is a component of ltim. 
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